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THE TORRENS SYSTEM

THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND TITLE
REGISTRATIONi-

S

By R. G. PATTON*

iNic written conveyances signed by the grantor became the
method of transferring title to real estate, three systems of
evidence of title have come successively into use. The first makes
no provision for registering or recording, but instead one proves
title, so far as it is made up of written conveyances, by production
of the original title papers or certified copies thereof. This system
is still in use in most of the counties of England, and to a limited
extent in the United States. The second system provides for the
registration or recording of conveyances; registration in Ireland,
Scotland, and a few counties of England; recording in Holland.
Denmark and the United States. Whether requiring instruments
to be recorded, or merely to be registered, it is spoken of generally
as a system requiring registration of the instruments of conveyance. The third system provides, instead, for registration of
the title itself (i. e., the ownership) rather than for registration of
the evidence of title.' This latter system is in force in New
,The introductory chapter of a Manual of Torrens Procedure (in preparation), by R. G. Patton, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
*Examiner of Titles and Referee for the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District (Hennepin County), Minnesota; member of the Committee
on Real Property Law of the Minnesota Bar Association; Chairman of the
Section of Real Property Law of the American Bar Association.
"'The basic principle of this system is the registration of the title to land
instead of registering, as the old system requires, the evidence of such title.
In the one case, only the ultimate fact or conclusion that a certain named
party has title to a particular tract of land is registered, and certificate
thereof delivered to him. In the other case, the entire evidence from which
the proposed purchasers must, at their peril draw such conclusion, is registered." Chief Justice Start in State v. Westfall. (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 89
N. W. 175.
"The official certificate will always show the state of the title and the
person in whom it is vested. The basic principle of the system is the registration of the title to the land, instead of registering, as under the old system.
the evidence of such title." In re Bickel, (1922) 301 II1.484. 134 N. E. 76.
"That registration of titles is in the abstract to be preferred to registration of assurances may at once be conceded, for the former aims at
presenting the intending purchaser or mortgagee with the net result of
former dealings with the property, while the latter places the dealings themselves before him, and leaves him to investigate them for himself. In one case
he finds, so to speak, the sum worked out for him: in the other he has the
figures given him, and has to work out the sum for himself." Report bf
Parliamentary Committee, 1878-9, Parliamentary Papers 1878-9. Vol. 11.
p. 9.
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Zealand, Australia, Western Canada, the City of London, the Philippines, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and in nineteen of our states-varying
from being used to a limited extent only in some jurisdictions to
being used exclusively in others. It resembles a system which
has been in vogue in Germany, Austria, the Scandinavian countries
and Switzerland for a great many years. The author of the AngloSaxon form of the system was a British customs officer in South
Australia. Upon being appointed registrar general of the province,
in charge of registering all instruments affecting title to real estate.
his experience in his former office with the ship registry system
led him to inquire why the title to a tract of land could not be
registered the same as could the title to a ship. He demonstrated
that it was entirely possible in that the statutes, called Torrens
Acts, which he was instrumental in having adopted by Australia
and New Zealand were entirely successful and have since been
enacted elsewhere as above mentioned.
To many of us the idea of registering title to a ship may be
more novel than registry of title to land. It is, however, a very
ancient system and is a good model for registration of title to
any kind of property. 2 Probably our nearest parallel is the evidencing of ownership of stock in a corporation by the issuance of stock
certificates. As against the company and the owner's creditors, one
cannot transfer title to corporation stock merely by delivery, or by
bill of sale-it is transferable on the books of the company only,
at the place where its stock register is kept. On presentation of a
stock certificate at the proper office, accompanied by a properly
executed assignment, either attached to, endorsed upon, or separate
from the certificate, the latter is cancelled and a new certificate is
issued to the purchaser containing no data as to its former owner2

Under the English Merchants' Shipping Law a page in the registry
was given to each ship registered, and on it appeared the name and description of the ship, the name of the owner and any liens or encumbrances. A
duplicate of this page in the form of a certificate was given to the owner
which was his evidence of ownership no matter where he might be. If there
were several owners-and it was quite customary to have ships divided into
shares of halves, quarters, eighths, etc.-each owner received a certificate for
his share. Any lien or claim against a ship was required to be noted on
the registry page, so that it was possible for any interested person at a glance
to see exactly the condition of the title. To make a transfer, it was necessary
to assign the certificate and take it to the registry office whereupon the old
certificate was cancelled, the old registry page closed, and a new page was
opened. A duplicate certificate, that is, a copy of the new registry page, was
given to the new owner. At no time was more than one certificate of the
same interest outstanding, and it was not necessary to go back of the face
of the outstanding certificate. There was no need to examine prior certificates, nor to scrutinize the legality of prior transactions.
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ship. If the certificate of stock presented calls for two shares of
stock and the transfer to the purchaser calls for but one, tle
transfer officer will issue a new certificate to the purchaser for the
one share he is entitled to and a residue certificate to the former
owner for the one share he did not sell. The old certificate in all
these instances is retained by the transfer officer and cancelled.

The same process is followed in transferring a registered bond.
Regardless, therefore, of whether we are familiar with registration
of title to ships or to land, we are all of us more or less familiar
with the general method of transfer of registered titles.
Contrasted with the simplicity of a title registration system.
we have long been familiar with the complexity of an instrument
registration system pertaining to bills of sale, chattel mortgages,
and conditional sales of chattels, and of an instrument recording
system for documents "whereby any interest in real estate is
created, aliened, mortgaged or assigned." Under the recording
system, a title is transferred at the risk of the buyer and subject
to all defects in its entire recorded history. It is very essential
therefore that a prospective purchaser make a careful investigation of that history. The system came into existence at a time
when, though real estate was the most valuable class of property,
it was entirely outside the realm of commerce and was the subject
of infrequent transactions. There was the pre-eminent necessity
of safeguarding the title and no necessity of facilitating speed)'
transfers. Since that time, however, many classes of personal
property have come to be equally valuable with real estate, and the
latter has come to be a commercial commodity. The title to rare
or valuable personal property should now have equal protection
with that to realty, and the latter should be transferable as readily
as the title to any equivalently high grade personal property. This
may best be accomplished, not by extending the operation of the
recording acts to personal property, but by adapting the personal
property registration systems to embrace titles to real estate. The
system of proof of title to land has already progressed from the
notoriety afforded by livery of seisin to the keeping of title deeds,
and from the latter to the registration or recording of all instruments affecting title. It has now entered upon an era of the registration of the title itself.
Proof of title from the original title deeds may do very well in
England, where transfers are still comparatively few and the
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business is concentrated in the offices of a limited number of family
solicitors; but it would have fallen down completely in the active
dealing in land and continued subdivision of land which has existed
in the United States, particularly during the settlement of its
public land areas. In turn, the system afforded by the recording
acts has served very well during a period when the total transfers
were so few that no chain of title was complicated, when there
were fewer people of the same name, and when there were fewer
people with the requisite knowledge to perpetrate title frauds. It
has always been subject to the objection that it made real estate
a slow asset. This is because of the time required to get abstracts
continued to date, to have them examined, and then to make compliance with requirements made by the examining attorney.? It
is further objectionable because the process makes unnecessary
expense to both vendor and purchaser, 4 because no examination
is conclusive, because examinations have to be made over and over
again for each new purchaser 5 with always the possibility of new
3

1n 1928, at the close of a real estate "boom" in which transfers had
increased to such an extent that transactions could not be closed till after
a delay of from five to six months, the Florida Association of Real Estate
Boards instituted a campaign for a Torrens system as a speedier method of
making transfers. The complaint was that the realtors had made no income
for their work for the last six months preceding collapse of the boom, due
to inability to close their transactions. See, Florida Realty Journal, January,
1930.
'It is probable, however, that the total expense to the public as a whole
is about the same under either system. As to registered land, the expense of
making voluntary transfers is greatly reduced, usually amounting to a total
of but three dollars, and requiring no abstract and a minimum of legal services. But in the case of an involuntary transfer, descent or devise, foreclosure,
execution sale, probate deed and the like, an order of court and often an
adjudication of validity is required before the transfer can be made effective
by issuance of a new certificate. For details see infra. The need for a
lawyer's services in effecting such transfers would appear to leave the gross
expense of all transfers about the same. There is, however, a greatly reduced
cost to the public by a lessened expense in the keeping of title records.
5
Part of an article in the New York Herald some years ago read as
follows: "Lately the Jumel property was cut up into 1383 pieces or parcels
of real estate and sold at partition sale. There appears to have been about
300 purchasers at that sale, and no doubt each buyer, before he paid his
money, carefully employed a good lawyer to examine the title to the lot or
plot that he had bought; so that three hundred lawyers, each of them carefully examined and went through the same work, viz.: the old deeds and(
mortgages and records affecting the whole property (for as it had never been
cut up before, each had to examine the title to the whole, no matter how
small his parcel) and each of them searched the same volumes of long lists
of names, and picked out from 3500 volumes of deeds and mortgages in the
New York Register's office, the same big dusty volumes of writing. and
lifted them down and looked them through, in all three hundred times of the
very same labor. Evidently two hundred ninety-nine times of that labor was
thrown away, done over and over again-uselessly,-and the clients, those
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objections to the title, because of the unnecessary increase in the
number of public records and space required for them, and because of insecurity due to defects of record or in pais which the
examiner has overlooked, or which could not be found by any
reasonable amount of investigation. The very fact that, with increasing value of the property and with increasing length and
intricacy of the record title, corporations have been organized in
some states to insure owners and mortgagees against loss by reason
of some of these risks shows that the system, at least as it now
exists, is inadequate for present needs. It can be improved in
many respects,6 but the only way to obviate all its defects is to
substitute for it as rapidly as possible the registration of title,
commonly known as the Torrens system."
When introduced in Australia in 1858, the system found immediate favor. The merits there disclosed led to its adoption in
New Zealand, Tasthania and the provinces of Western Canada.
After forty years of parliamentary investigation of all known
systems, including our recording acts, England adopted it in 1897
for the purpose of untangling the complications involving titles in
the City of London. Laws patterned after the English colonial
statutes were enacted by Illinois and Ohio in 1895 and 1896, respectively. They were promptly declared unconstitutional., Thi.
buyers, together paid three hundred fees to those lawyers (who each earned

his money) but evidently two hundred ninety-nine of those fees were for
repetitions of the very same work. By and by, twenty years front now.

instead of only three hundred owners of those Jumel plots, the whole 1383
lots will be sold and built upon, and 1383 new purchasers will again pay 1383
lawyers 1383 fees for examining that same Jumel title. By that time (at the
present rate of growth, and unless a remedy is applied) there will be fully
10,000 big folio volumes in the new hall of records, and the 1383 fees will
be for mere repetitions of labor so far as the whole Jumel estate is concerned.
and will be practically wasted."
6
The American Title Association (composed of title companies. abstractors, and title examiners) has at various times considered the matter. At
present, the Section of Real Property Law of the American Bar Association
has a Committee on Improvement of Title Records. It is to e hoped that
through the work of these or other agencies legislatures may be induced to
remove some of the most apparent defects in the recording act systems.
7Velie, The Problem of Land Titles, (1929) 44 Pol. Sci. Q. 421; Rood.
Brief for the Torrens System, (1914) 12 Mich. L. Rev. 379; Beale, Registration of Title to Land, (1893) 6 Harv. L. Rev. 369: Wiginore. Committee
Report, (1912) 37 Reports of Am. Bar Ass'n 1148.
Statutes providing a state with a Torrens System of Title Registration
should not be enacted, however, until a substantial number of lawyers, realtors, owners or mortgage investors desire it. No good end is served by a
state providing legal machinery which is not likely to be put to use.
sPeople v. Chase, (1897) 165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454. State v. Guilbert.
(1897) 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551.
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was because they were not drafted to suit the requirements of
states bound by written constitution. It was plain that the only
way that the Torrens system could be used in the United States
was to provide for decision by the judiciary department of every
question which belongs exclusively to that department and to bar
no rights in real estate except by measures which conform to the
decisions of our courts as to what constitutes due process of law.
The cases having established the boundary line beyond which the
acts might not go, the next Legislative Assembly of Illinois enacted
a new law 9 which was drafted in form to remove the constitutional
objections existing in the former act. Following the provisions
perhaps of the Illinois "burnt record acts," it provided that a court
of competent jurisdiction should determine the ownership, as a
basis for original registration. The law was attacked' ° on the
ground that it also provided for the performance of judicial duties
by the registrar in the matter of his determining after registration
the validity of liens offered for filing against the title. The court
held the act valid for the reason that, though the powers conferred
were semi-judicial, they were not of a class that their decision was
vested solely in the judiciary. The Massachusetts act passed the
year following" was next attacked on the ground of diversion of
judicial power and lack of provision for due process of law, but
was held constitutional. 1 2- Then followed the decision of the
supreme court of Minnesota 3 upholding the constitutionality of
our own act'" as against attacks urging the same points.
In addition to the states mentioned, Illinois, Massachusetts and
Minnesota, the system has been adopted in California, Colorado,
Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia and Washington; also in Porto Rico, Hawaii and
the Philippines. All of the acts in this country leave the matter
of original registration optional with the owner; in the Philippines
it is compulsory as to public lands patented subsequent to the
9Illinois, Laws 1897, 141.
'OPeople v. Simon, (1890) 176 Ill.
165, 52 N. E. 910, 68 Am. St. Rep.
175, 44 L. R. A. 801.
"Massachusetts,
Acts, 1898. ch. 562.
' 2 Tyler v. Judges. (1900) 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812. 51 L. R. A. 433.
"3State v. Westfall, (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175.
14Minnesota, Laws 1901, ch. 237. (Amended Act is chap. 65 of Revision
of 1905 and of General Statutes of 1913, 1923 and 1927.) Torrens statutes
differ somewhat in different states, and a careful comparison discloses that
Minnesota has one of the best. Land Title Registration by Certificate, Bulletin No. 1, Federal Farm Loan Bureau.
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taking effect of the act; in Hawaii it is compulsory as to lands
owned by corporations. In Chicago and Minneapolis, the cities
have adopted resolutions which to a limited extent amount to
compulsory features in that all lands about to be purchased by
the cities or by any of their subdivisions must first be placed under
the Torrens system.' 5 In Minneapolis, the resolution provides
that otherwise the city must acquire its title by proceedings of
eminent domain, that being the only method by which an
equivalently good title, as against all the world, can be acquired.
The matter of transferring a title from the rtcording act
system to the Torrens system is by a judicial proceeding in the
nature of a suit to quiet title against all persons, both known and
unknown, who could by any possibility assert an adverse right.
The proceeding differs from the ordinary equity action to quiet
title and from the statutory action to determine adverse claims in
that it is supervised at all stages by an officer of the court, known
as the examiner of titles, and in that, in addition to the usual findings and adjudications of the judgment or decree in such actions,
it provides for the issuance by a county official known as the
registrar of titles of a certificate of title which sets forth all the
essential facts determined by the decree. The plan is that the
decree and the issuance of the certificate of title thereunder, aided
to a certain extent by a statute of limitation, shall constitute the
starting point of the title under the new system. The certificate
sets forth the name of the owner or owners in fee simple and
also all other rights, interests and liens to which the property is
then subject. The order or decree of registration is retained by
the clerk of court as the final order in the Torrens proceeding.
The certificate of title is a page in a register kept by the registrar
of titles. A copy of this page called "owner's duplicate certificate
of title" is delivered to the owner. Mortgagees and lessees may
procure what are known as mortgagee's and lessee's duplicates.
The operative act to transfer a registered title is performed by
the registrar of titles in cancelling an outstanding certificate and
in issuing a new certificate to the transferee. In the case of
voluntary transfers, his authority to perform this act comes from
the filing with him of a deed in the same form as is used for the
conveyance of an unregistered title. However, just as in the case
of an assignment of a certificate of stock the assignment must be
25 Chicago, March 3, 1919, Journal of Proceedings, pp. 1774-5; .Mimieapolis, Resolution of July 12, 1929.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

accompanied by the certificate, and in the case of a check upon
the savings account it must be accompanied by the pass book, so
here the deed must be accompanied by the owner's duplicate
certificate of title. This is an infallible method of identification.
So long as the owner takes proper care of his duplicate, it is an
absolute safeguard against loss of title by reason of a forged
deed.1"
In the case of involuntary transfers, however, there is a radical
difference from the procedure which applies to unregistered land
in that the iegistrar cannot recognize any such transfer unless
accompanied by an order of court directing him to receive it for
the purpose of registration. These orders are all based upon a
final adjudication determining the rights of all parties involved.
This may have been in the probate court in the form of a final
decree of distribution; or, it may have been in the district court
as, for instance, a decree of partition. Again it may be an order
directing a conveyance, such as an order of license to sell or a
judgment on foreclosure of a mortgage or a mechanic's lien. In
all such cases, if the proceedings are jurisdictionally regular, and
the time to appeal has expired, the court's order to the registrar,
to make the transfer by cancellation of the outstanding certificate
and issuance of a new certificate, is made without notice, all rights
having been already adjudicated. But if an order is desired to
effect a transfer by reason of some matter in pais, such as a foreclosure by advertisement, a lost or destroyed deed, the happening
of a condition, or the like, the order can be issued only after proper
notice and hearing.
In other words, the conclusiveness of the original
certificate of
title is based upon an adjudication and upon statutes of limitation ;
and each subsequent certificate is based upon either (1) a voluntary
transfer as to which, in addition to the usual safeguards, an owner's duplicate certificate furnishes additional proof of identity, or
(2) upon an involuntary transfer based upon or confirmed by a
iGEliason v. Wilborn, (1929) 335 Il1. 352, 360, 167 N. E. 101, aff'd
(1930) 281 U. S. 457, 50 Sup. Ct. 334, 382, 74 L. Ed. 962. 1179, 68 A. I.. 1R.
350, 357 n.
Conversely, one who delivers his duplicate certificate to a party who
may forge a deed to accompany it gives to that party the power to cause a
transfer of the title which in the hands of a bona fide purchaser will be
unassailable. Contrary to what is the case with records under the recording
acts, a bona fide purchaser may absolutely depend upon the certificate. Id.
An owner should, therefore, take the same care of his identifying duplicate
as he would of the keys to his safety deposit box.
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final order entered after due notice and hearing and in form to
constitute res adjudicata. The title shown by a certificate is at all
17
times an adjudicated title.

In the matter of rights and interests less than the fee simple
title, these are set forth in the first certificate in accordance with
the decree entered in the registration proceeding, as are also all
mortgages and other liens adjudged to be existing at that time.
Thereafter, all such interests or liens created by voluntary act of
the owner are registered by presentation to the registrar of the
owner's duplicate certificate and the filing with him of the instrument creating them. The registrar endorses upon all such instruments a document number and the time of registration and then
retains them in his files. At the same time, he enters a "memorial,"
being a brief abstract of the instrument, upon tile original certificate in his office and upon the owner's duplicate certificate, the
latter being at once returned to the owner. In the case of involuntary interests or liens, such as an eminent domain proceeding,
a judgment, a mechanic's lien claim, or the like, the registrar must
receive these for registration as memorials upon the original certificate of title without presentation of the owner's duplicate cer-.
tificate. They will be copied onto the owner's duplicate without
charge whenever it is presented, but entry thereon is not comnpulsory or essential.
A purchaser may, therefore, rely upon the owner's duplicate
certificate as to the condition of the fee title and as to all voluntary
encumbrances; but to know the condition as to involuntary encumbrances he must make inquiry at the office of the registrar of
titles, or must have the owner's duplicate presented and the
memorials brought up to date.
There are found a few matters of encumbrance which it is not
practicable to show upon the certificate of title. The statutes of
all states having Torrens systems make certain exceptions, therefore, from the certificate, and, as to these, a purchaser or lender
must make investigation other than from the certificate. The
usual matters excepted are rights of appeal, short time leases,
public highways, current taxes, and liens or rights arising under
the laws of the United States which the state statutes cannot require to be placed of record. In Minnesota, there is the further
exception of the rights of any party in possession under an unl7 State v. Westfall, (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 447, 89 N. Mr. 175.
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registered deed or contract for (leed. But in no state is there any
exception of, nor need any inquiry be made as to, rights by prescription or adverse possession. The statutes provide that no such
rights can be acquired as to registered land.
Discharges and assignments of interests less than the fee title
are made by the registration of operative instruments upon the
certificate of title. The fee owner, holding the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, has, of course, no interest in these and need
not, therefore, present his owner's duplicate. If,however, a lessee
or mortgagee has procured a lessee's duplicate or a mortgagee's
duplicate, any registration of a transaction in regard to the lease
or mortgage must be accompanied by presentation of his duplicate.
In addition to information which may be had by personal inspection of the original certificate, or by a written or telephoned
inquiry to the registrar, or by having one of the duplicate certificates continued to date to show all the memorials appearing on
the'original certificate, the registrar must furnish (for a fee of
one dollar in most states) a certificate showing the true condition
of any title registered under the system. The fee is small, bit
.since the other methods are available with no expense whatever,
"certificates of condition of title" are seldom procured.
The conclusiveness of a Torrens certificate is of vital interest
to the holder, to mortgagees who loan him money, and to anyone
who is about to purchase the title from him. Though such a
certificate is the best evidence of title which has ever been devised
and the least subject to attack, it would probably work more injury
than benefit to have the necessary statutory and constitutional
provisions which would make it one hundred per cent. conclusive.
For all practical purposes, it is conclusive.' s Though it might be
an advantage to some particular person in a very few instance,
to have it more so, this would not be to the advantage of the public
in general. For instance, in the matter of the first certificate after
initial registration of the title and also in the case of a certificate
issued on an order of court pursuant to an involuntary transfer,
there is always a right of appeal."' \Vhile these certificates could
be made more conclusive by abolishing the right of appeal, no onc
would maintain that this should be done. l)uring the appeal period,
that right isa hazard which one dealing with land nst assumle.
l8Loring M. Staples, Conclusiveness of a Torreiis Certificate of Titl.
(1924)

8 MXINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 200.

"M.ason's 1927 Minn. Stat.. sec. 8275.
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unless he procures a release thereof, regardless of whether the
title is under the Torrens system or the recording act system. In
either case during the existence of that period, a particularly
cautious investor might wish to examine as to the sufficiency of
the proceedings to bar all rights and as to the probabilities of a
reversal on appeal. Most of such orders, however, are entered by
default on a record which would not afford any ground for reversal, and neither in the case of a registered title nor of an unregistered title is such an examination often made. As to a
registered title in particular, the combined care bestowed upon
such proceedings by the applicant's attorney, the examiner of
titles, and the court precludes the likelihood of judicial error.
Another item of inconclusiveness, which it would certainly be
inadvisable to abrogate, is the right of a defrauded party to have
set aside and cancelled a certificate outstanding in the name of a
party who perpetrated a fraud by reason of which it was issued,
or of one who had knowledge or notice of the fraud.2- While
estoppel by a decree is the most binding form of estoppel which
exists, there has always been a right to have a judgment set aside
where fraud has been practiced in procuring its entry. Though to
a minor extent this undermines the conclusiveness of all judgments, it is a principle which unfortunately but necessarily must
be preserved-and in Torrens proceedings the same as in other
cases. However, there can be no danger from this point of inconclusiveness to a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee, and the
danger most properly exists as to one holding a certificate obtained
by fraud, or with notice of fraud.
The further point in which such a certificate might prove inconclusive is the one instance in which a party whose claim of right
has not been barred by a decree, due to his not having been made
a party to the proceeding, cannot be barred by limitation statute.
The only such party is one who was at the time an occupant of
the property pursuant to his right. He has no need of any machinery of the law. to enforce his rights, and, consequently, the
withdrawal by statute of limitation of the right to use the legal
machinery of the state can have no effect upon him.21 Inasmuch.
however, as the parties to Torrens proceedings embrace not only
those whose rights appear of record and the usual unknown parties.
2

°Baart v. Martin, (1906)

Rep. 394.
2

99 Minn. 197, 108 N. W. 945. 116 Am. St

'State v. Westfall, (1902) 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175.
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but also all parties found to be in possession of the premises, inconclusiveness on account of the situation mentioned can only
exist where no investigation of occupancy has been made. 'lhe
possibility of the subsistence of such a right after registration is
very remote.
The Torrens statutes of all states provide for an assurance
fund. This is no more essential to a Torrens system than to a recording act system. It is, however, more in line with social justice, and its existence in the Torrens system probably occurs by
reason of the fact that the statutes establishing these systems in
the various jurisdictions were enacted at a later period than the
recording acts. Under any system, there is the possibility of some
official, even the court, making an error which will bar a right
which should not have been barred. When this occurs under the
recording act system, there is usually no chance of recovery.
However, under the Torrens statutes, a fund has been created to
reimburse anyone so unfortunate as to lose a lien upon, or an interest in, the land involved by reason of entry of a decree or the
issuance of a certificate which erroneously fails to preserve his
rights. - There are seldom any demands upon this fund, and it
need not be large. In the State of Minnesota, it is made up by
collecting on all original registrations, and on all transfers by
descent or devise, one-tenth of one per cent. on the assessed value
of the land, exclusive of improvements. 23 The fund is also increased by the accumulation of interest. In most countries, no
call has ever been made upon this fund."
Though registration lessens the expense of transfers after the
22
Although instances can be conceived in which a fee owner would be
reimbursed from this fund, it is primarily not a fund for his benefit. 'rile
statute contemplates no risk to his title. The size of a county assuraice fund
should not therefore be compared to an insurance fund or a title company
capitalization maintained to protect an owner or mortgagee of a title still
under a recording act system.
23
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8320.
24
But see Horgan v. Sargent, (1930) 182 Minn. 100, 233 N. W. 800.
In this case the registrar memorialized a $3800 mortgage as being for $3300.
A bona fide purchaser of the owner's equity, computed on the basis of the
record, paid the full amount of the mortgage and recovered from the assurance fund the amount of his loss-apparently as subrogee of the mortgagee.
Had a similar mistake been made in recording a mortgage in the office of a
register of deeds, no recovery would have been possible. Parret v. Shaubhut.
(1861) 5 Minn. 33 (Gil. 258), 8 Am. Dec. 424; and Foster v. Malniberg.
(1912) 119 Minn. 168, 127 N. W. 816; Beekman v. Frost, (1820) 18 Johns
Ch. (N.Y.) 544, 9 Am. Dec. 246; Prouty v. Marshall, (1909) 225 Pa. St.
570. 74 Ati. 550, 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1211 ; Terrell v. Andrew County, (1869)
44 Mo. 309.
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land is once registered, the cost of the court proceeding made
necessary by our state and federal constitutions has caused the
growth of the system to be much slower in the states which have
adopted it than was the case in the British colonies. For this
reason, though practically all titles in the western provinces of
Canada are now registered, there is no county in any of the states
named in which the titles subject to the recording acts do not as
yet greatly exceed the number which have been registered. In
fact, there are many counties in each of these states which have
yet to entertain their first registration proceeding. Hlowever, additional counties are from time to time adding the necessary record
books to make title registration possible, and use of the system is
gradually increasing. The extent to which titles are brought into
the registration system varies in different states, and in the counties of any given state, according to the amount of information
disseminated regarding its advantages and according to the amount
of opposition encountered. The system has the approval of the
large mortgage loan companies, insurance companies, federal loan
agencies and trust companies. Local bankers and realtors usually
prefer to deal with titles which are registered. In some states,
the abstracters and title companies that first opposed the system
on the supposition that it menaced the continuation of their business have found that any such result is remote and that abstract
continuations required for initial registration proceedings more
than offset their loss of business because of lack of need for
abstracts in subsequent transactions. The system has the approval
of lawyers generally, and the American Bar Association has endorsed the system and has included a model Torrens Act in the
uniform laws which it from time to time recommends.25 Instead
of earning a living by examining abstracts and title records, most
lawyers prefer the work of registering titles and of conducting the
proceedings for new certificates required in the case of involuntary
transfers. This is fully as profitable and more in line with professional training and experience. The general public, so far as
it is informed upon the subject, prefers to buy a registered title,
but is often not so keen about registering its own titles because of
the initial expense. This amounts in Hennepin County to a bar
association rate of seventy-five dollars and upwards for the attorney and about twenty dollars in filing and publication fees.
25(1916) 41 Reports of Am. Bar Ass'n 428.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

In Ramsey and St. Louis Counties, the cost is about the same, but
in other counties it runs from ten dollars to twenty dollars more,
because of the fact that the examiner is paid by the applicant instead of by the county.
Those who at present have their titles registered are comprised
mainly within four classes:
First. Prudent and conservative men, who, as a business precaution, are desirous of having the title to their real estate in the
best possible condition, so that in case of selling it or borrowing
upon it there will be no delay because of title questions, and so
that, in case of their decease, no troublesome questions may arise
to vex their heirs or devisees.
Second. Those whose titles are clouded or affected by some
irregularity or defect, which, while their right to possession is undisputed, seriously impairs the market value of the land. In such
cases, the Torrens law is resorted to instead of the older action to
determine adverse claims. The expense is approximately the same,
but the registration proceeding entails less work for the attorney
and affords greater value to the client.
Third. Those who have derived their title through a sale for
taxes, or under a mortgage foreclosure by advertisement. In
such cases, enough of the proceeding is in pais to leave such uncertainty as to validity of the title that a prospective purchaser is
justifiably loath to accept a conveyance until there has been an
adjudication such as results from a Torrens proceeding.
Fourth. Those who own an entire addition or a number of
adjoining lots. All the lots may be registered in one proceeding,
and the owner may then sell his lots, one or more at a time, and
not be to the expense of furnishing an abstract with each lot.
The same considerations apply in the registration of a tract of land
20
about to be subdivided..
Fifth. Those owning land acquired by accretion or reliction.
In such cases, the state, as the owner of all land forming the bed
of public waters, is a necessary party defendant, and it is in a
Torrens action only that this is allowed. In other words, there is
no method other than a Torrens action by which an owner can
20

Notable subdivisions in Hennepin County to which title has been regis-

tered at the time of or before platting are Shenandoah Terrace, Sunset
Gables, Homewood, Camden Homes, Lake Nokomis Shores, Liberty Heights,
Victory View, Minneapolis Industrial District, Robbinsdale Home Gardens.
Thielen's Brookside, Shirley Hills, Fairwood Park, Avalon, Pembroke,
\Vychwood.
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make of record a title which he has acquired to land below a
meander line.
Sixth. Those owning property of great value or property
acquired for a specific purpose who cannot, therefore, afford to
take any chance on their ability to retain it by relying on the
warranties in their deeds or upon the apparent regularity of the
deed records. Examples are registrations of business blocks,
mining properties, plants and buildings of the telephone company,
etc.

27

The reasons why all titles should be transferred from the
recording system to the Torrens system have been well stated to
be as follows:
1. Elimination of loss of title due to someone occupying a part
or all of the premises adversely. (After a title has been registered,
there is no such thing as anyone acquiring title by adverse possession.)
2. Elimination of the necessity of ever having to defend one's
title because of forgery of one's name to a deed or mortgage. A
forger can accomplish nothing with a forged instrument unless he
also has possession of the owner's duplicate certificate of title."'
3. Ability to close real estate transactions with the same
absence of delay as in sales of personal property and freedom from
loss of sales incident to delays necessary in case of unregistered
titles.
4. Decrease in expense of making a transfer by deed (no expense to the seller and only a three dollar registration fee on the
part of the purchaser).
5. Immunity from having one's title clouded by the docketing
of judgments against someone else of the same name as owner.
6. Speed with which a cloud upon a registered title may be
removed.
7. Only method of furnishing a record title to land acquired
by accretion or reliction.
8. Title made "marketable," and that condition thereafter always kept up to date.
27

Examples in Minneapolis: McKnight Building, Frontenac Building,
Lumber Exchange Building, Evanston Block, Citizen's Aid Building, Northwestern Terminal Company Building, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company Building (also all its plants and exchange buildings), St. Mark's
Church, Strutwear Building, Oak Grove Apartments, Interlachen Club.
Northland Milk & Ice Cream Company, National Tea Company, Calhoun
Beach
2 Apartments, Asbury Hospital.
SSee ante, Voluntary Conveyance and Mortgage.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

9. To secure immunity from risk of loss, or impairment of
title from the dangers incident to a title based upon the recording
system, such as: forged deeds (deed void) ; deeds recorded which
have never been "delivered" (deed void) ; deed executed pursuant
to a forged or undelivered power of attorney or executed after
revocation of the power by death or insanity of the maker (deed
void); a deed voidable because of infancy of the grantor; deed
void (in some cases) because of mental incompetency of grantor;
record void because of forgery of certificate of acknowledgment;
will produced for probate after conveyance by heirs at law; deed
from one other than the owner but having the same name as the
owner (a species of forgery) ;29 deed by grantor supposed to be
single but in fact married, or from a married grantor joined by a
person who is not the grantor's spouse;iO void divorce decree;
claimants not barred by a legal proceeding upon which a title is
based; will partially revoked by birth of a posthumous child;
overruling of decisions upon the principle of which the validity
of a title depends; a trusteeship of which the illegality has not been
discovered; deed .signed "by mark" when grantor was not conscious; lack of title in a "record owner" by reason of matters
which need not be made a matter of record or which do not depend
upon the record (e.g., adverse possession); conflicting government patents, of which one only appears in the county records; etc.
The number of cases on the foregoing points are sufficiently
numerous to show that risks from these sources are far from
minor. The courts recognize this fact and have said with reference
to a title based upon the recording act that "it is impossible in the
nature of things that there should be a mathematical certainty of
a good title."'1 However, since the establishment of the Torrens
System, we find that there can be a certainty as to title. Many
statements of courts and text'writers are to be found, such as the
following: "The purpose of this statute is to create a judgment
in rem perpetually conclusive. Other proceedings in rem may
determine the status of a ship or other chattel that is transient;
this legislation provides for a decree that shall conclude the title
to an interest that is to be as lasting as the land itself.1 82 "Besides
29
See
3

Loughran v. Gorman, (1912) 256 Ill.
46, 99 N. E. 886.
ORux v. Adam, (1919) 143 Minn. 35, 172 N. W. 912.
3'First, etc., Society v. Brown, (1888) 147 Mass. 296. 17 N. E. 349.
32
Smith v. Martin, (1910) 69 Misc. Rep. 108, 111, 124 N. Y. S.1064.
33
Robbins, The Torrens System, (1902) 54 Cent. L. J. 282. 290.
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clearing and registering the title and facilitating its transfer, the
Torrens system practically guarantees, in behalf of the state, that
the holder of a registered title has an absolute and indefeasible
interest which can never be questioned on any ground whatever.""
"The purpose of the Torrens Law is to establish an indefeasible title free from any and all rights or claims not registered with
the registrar of titles, with certain unimportant exceptions, to the
end that any one may deal with such property with the assurance
that the only rights13 or
claims of which he need take notice are
4
those so registered.
34

In re Juran, (1929)

178 Minn. 55, 226 N. W. 201.

